When the next big storm hits NJ, is your water system ready? Most aren’t.

Published by NJ Clean Stream  |  Climate Change & NJ Water Supply Series, Article 3 of 3

On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy devastated New Jersey’s water and wastewater infrastructure — flooding treatment plants, disabling pumping stations, cutting power to hundreds of thousands of customers, and leaving communities without safe water for days to weeks. More than a decade later, the honest answer to whether New Jersey’s water systems are genuinely prepared for the next major storm is: some are, and most are not.

What happened to NJ water infrastructure during Sandy

Flooding of treatment plants and pumping stations. Many water and wastewater treatment facilities in the coastal zone and along tidal rivers were flooded by storm surge. Flooding disabled electrical equipment — motors, switchgear, control systems — located at grade or below grade. Flooded electrical equipment is destroyed, not simply wet. Recovery time for flooded treatment plants was measured in weeks to months.

Power outages. Sandy caused the largest power outage in New Jersey history — millions of customers without electricity for days to weeks. Water utilities depend on electric power to operate treatment processes, pumping stations, and control systems. While many utilities had backup generators for primary treatment facilities, backup generation was often insufficient to maintain full operations across all distribution pumping stations, creating low-pressure or no-pressure conditions in portions of the distribution system.

Communication and control system failures. SCADA systems that provide remote monitoring and control of distributed infrastructure depend on communication infrastructure — fiber optic lines, cellular towers, radio systems — that Sandy damaged, leaving utilities without visibility into the operational status of distant infrastructure components.

Distribution system intrusion from flooding. In flooded areas, the pressure differential between floodwater outside pipes and reduced pressure inside — caused by high demand during and after the storm — could allow contaminated flood water to enter the distribution system through micro-cracks, joint gaps, and service connection defects. Boil water advisories issued to millions of customers after Sandy reflected the real possibility of distribution system contamination during the event.

What resilience actually requires

Flood protection for critical infrastructure. Every critical component — treatment plants, pumping stations, electrical equipment, control rooms — should be sited above the design flood level or protected by flood barriers adequate to withstand the flooding expected under the combination of sea level rise, storm surge, and extreme rainfall that constitutes the design storm for resilience planning. This design storm should not be based on historical storm frequency data alone; it must incorporate sea level rise projections for the planning horizon — typically 50 to 100 years for major capital infrastructure.

“Designed to handle a 100-year flood” is no longer an adequate resilience standard. The 100-year flood of 2000 is not the 100-year flood of 2050, because sea levels in 2050 will be higher than they were in 2000, raising the baseline on which storm surge is superimposed.

Backup power for all critical facilities. Every facility that must operate to maintain safe water service during and after a storm should have backup power capable of sustained operations — not just 24 to 72 hours, but up to 14 days without commercial power restoration. After Sandy, commercial power was not restored in some affected areas for weeks. Fuel supply for backup generators is itself a resilience challenge; utilities must have either on-site storage adequate for extended operations or priority fuel supply arrangements that can deliver during emergency conditions.

Emergency interconnections. Physical connections between adjacent utilities’ distribution systems allow one utility to supply water to a neighboring system during an emergency — providing mutual aid capability that dramatically increases system resilience. New Jersey has made progress in developing emergency interconnection capability following Sandy, but the network remains incomplete.

Redundant SCADA and communications. SCADA systems should have redundant communication pathways — not dependent on any single technology that can be disrupted by storm damage — so utilities retain visibility and control of distributed infrastructure even when primary communication systems are damaged.

Emergency response plans that are actually exercised. Paper plans that have never been tested provide limited value when an actual emergency occurs. Utilities should conduct regular exercises — including scenarios involving loss of power, loss of communications, facility flooding, and distribution system contamination — so that staff understand their roles before the emergency happens.

What Hurricane Ida revealed about inland resilience gaps

Sandy was primarily a coastal storm. The September 2021 remnants of Hurricane Ida revealed a different vulnerability: extreme rainfall in inland and urban areas. Ida’s remnants produced more than six inches of rain in several hours in some New Jersey locations — far beyond the design capacity of stormwater infrastructure throughout the state. Water and wastewater infrastructure failures during Ida were widespread and affected communities well inland from the coast.

The Ida experience revealed that resilience planning cannot focus only on coastal storm surge scenarios. It must also address extreme rainfall scenarios that are becoming more frequent as a warmer atmosphere produces more intense precipitation events. Stormwater systems and treatment plants in many of New Jersey’s older inland cities were no better designed for extreme rainfall than coastal infrastructure was designed for storm surge.

The resilience planning gap: where most utilities stand

Despite Sandy’s experience and subsequent federal rebuilding investment, most New Jersey water utilities remain significantly underprepared for the next major storm. Resilience investments — flood protection, backup power upgrades, emergency interconnections, SCADA redundancy — are expensive “insurance” investments that do not improve daily water service and consistently lose out to rate pressures and maintenance backlogs.

The regulatory framework has not adequately filled this gap. New Jersey does not currently require water utilities to conduct and submit climate vulnerability assessments. It does not require utilities to demonstrate adequate backup power, flood protection, or emergency interconnection capability. It does not mandate emergency response plan exercises. The standards that would require these investments exist in guidance documents — they are not enforceable requirements.

What regulatory reform would look like

  • Mandatory climate vulnerability assessments. Every community water system should be required to conduct a climate vulnerability assessment using standardized NJ DEP methodology, identifying specific vulnerabilities to flooding, power outages, extreme rainfall, and storm surge, with prioritized capital investment plans. Updated every five years.
  • Flood protection standards for new and rebuilt infrastructure. Any new construction or major reconstruction should meet flood protection standards based on the projected 100-year flood under 2050 sea level rise conditions — not the historical 100-year flood. Incorporated into NJ DEP regulatory review requirements for all water utility capital projects.
  • Backup power requirements. Every water utility should be required to have backup power capable of sustaining essential operations for a minimum of 14 days without commercial power restoration. Utilities that cannot demonstrate compliance should be required to develop and fund a compliance schedule.
  • Emergency interconnection requirements. NJ DEP should establish a program requiring adjacent utilities to develop and test emergency water supply interconnections, providing mutual aid capability across the state’s fragmented utility landscape.
  • Emergency response plan standards and exercises. Water utilities should be required to maintain current, tested emergency response plans and conduct documented exercises annually.

What the public can do

Storm resilience is not just a technical and regulatory challenge — it is a civic and political challenge. Resilience investments are only made when regulation requires them or when public pressure on utility management and governing boards makes them unavoidable. After a major storm, the political will to invest in resilience is briefly available — the memory of water service failures is fresh. The advocates and engaged citizens who ensure that window stays open year after year are the ones who will determine whether New Jersey is actually prepared for the next Sandy or the next Ida.

NJ Clean Stream tracks water utility resilience planning progress across the state, publishes findings, engages utility boards and state regulators on resilience requirements, and works with community advocates to build the sustained civic pressure that makes long-term resilience investment politically unavoidable. Visit njcleanstream.org/take-action to contact your state legislators about mandatory climate vulnerability assessment requirements and to find your water utility’s next board meeting.

This is Article 3 of 3 in NJ Clean Stream’s Climate Change & NJ Water Supply Series. Article 1 explains the four mechanisms through which climate change is stressing NJ’s water infrastructure. Article 2 examines saltwater intrusion into South Jersey’s drinking water and what adaptation looks like.